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PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
HATCH-WAXMAN CASES
Michael Marusak+
Historically, pharmaceutical companies hoping to produce “generic” versions
of newly-patented drugs were required to wait for patents to expire before they
could begin testing their drug—let alone release it to market—otherwise their
actions likely constituted patent infringement.1 But ever since Congress enacted
the Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman or the Act) in 1984,2 generic drug
companies have been able to get lower-cost drugs to market faster, providing the
public with an important benefit.3 One way Hatch-Waxman helps generic drugs
get to market faster is by streamlining the process for approval by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Specifically, the Act allows generic companies to
file an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), which states that the company
is going to make a chemical equivalent of a patent owner’s drug.4 In addition,
the company may fill out a “Paragraph IV certification,” stating that it intends
to market its drug before the patent’s expiration because the patent is invalid or
not infringed by the generic company’s drug.5
Patent owners can typically file infringement suits in any state the generic
drugs are sold because specific personal jurisdiction is satisfied.6 However, the
analysis is more complicated in ANDA cases because, at the time suit is filed,
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2017, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
B.S. 2011, Villanova University. The author would like to thank Professor Megan M. La Belle for
her invaluable guidance, expertise, and patience throughout the research, writing, and editing
process for this Comment. The author is also grateful to his colleagues at the Catholic University
Law Review for their significant time and effort, and their excellent attention to detail in preparing
this Comment for publication.
1. See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 9–11 (3d ed. 2015).
2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc; 28
U.S.C. § 2201; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)).
3. See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15; see also, e.g., Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between
Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417–18 (2011); Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 607 (2003).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012) (providing that an ANDA needs to contain
“information to show that the new drug is bioequivalent to the listed drug”).
5. Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
6. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation? 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 895 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Forum Shopping]; see also
Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction was appropriate in the forum where a defendant’s infringing
products competed with the plaintiff’s patented products because it was the place where “infringing
activity directly impact[ed] on the interests of the patentee,” i.e., “the place of infringing sales”).
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the generic company has not sold the allegedly infringing product anywhere.7
Instead, the generic has committed an “artificial” act of infringement simply by
filing an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification.8
Until recently, federal courts solved this problem by relying on a theory of
general, rather than specific, personal jurisdiction in ANDA cases,9 because
patent owners could sue in any state under a “doing business” theory of general
jurisdiction.10 In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,11 and
Daimler AG v. Bauman,12 however, the Supreme Court overhauled the general
jurisdiction doctrine. Specifically, the Court held that continuous and systematic
contacts alone are insufficient to subject a defendant to general jurisdiction in a
forum.13 Rather, the defendant’s contacts with the state must be sufficient to
render it “essentially at home.”14 For a corporation, “home” is where it is
incorporated or headquartered.15
This heightened standard raises important questions regarding personal
jurisdiction in ANDA cases.16 The problem is demonstrated by two federal court
cases decided by different judges in the U.S. District Court for the District of

7. Eric H. Weisblatt & Claire Frezza, Who to Sue and Where in ANDA Litigation: Personal
Jurisdiction Post-Daimler, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 352 (2014).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990)
(“That is what is achieved by § 271(e)(2) – the creation of a highly artificial act of infringement
that consists of submitting an ANDA . . . containing the fourth type of certification that is in error
as to whether commercial manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug . . . violates the relevant
patent.”); see also Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 7, at 352.
9. See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.,
693 F. Supp. 2d 409, 420–21 (D. Del. 2010); Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 629 F. Supp.
2d 338, 348–49 (D. Del. 2009); Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 05C6561, 2006 WL
850916, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006); see also Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 7, at 352, 355–
56.
10. See, e.g., Cephalon, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 343, 348–49 (finding that an ANDA filer’s
historical sales and business dealings in Delaware meant it regularly did business there, constituting
systematic and continuous contacts with the forum, and subjecting it to the court’s exercise of
general jurisdiction even though it was incorporated in Nevada and headquartered in California);
Abbott, 2006 WL 850916, at *3–5 (finding that the historical volume of an ANDA filer’s sales in
Illinois meant it was “doing business” there, subjecting it to general jurisdiction though it was a
West Virginia corporation).
11. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
12. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
13. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
14. Id.
15. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (concluding that a corporation is at home where it is
incorporated and where it has its “principal place of business”); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
80–81 (2010) (determining that a corporation’s principal place of business is the place where its
“high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities . . . which will
typically be found at a corporation’s headquarters”).
16. Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 7, at 352–56 (recognizing that Daimler “dramatically
affects where patent holders are able to file suit in ANDA litigations,” and suggesting ways specific
and general jurisdiction will be treated differently post-Daimler).
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Delaware.17 In both cases, Mylan, a generic drug manufacturer headquartered
and incorporated in West Virginia, filed an ANDA with the FDA (located in
Maryland), and was sued in Delaware for patent infringement under HatchWaxman.18 As the Federal Circuit had already established that Maryland courts
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over generics solely on the basis of the
FDA’s location,19 the patent owners, AstraZeneca and Acorda, both filed suit
against Mylan in their state of incorporation, Delaware.20 Mylan moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in both cases.21 Although Mylan is
registered to do business in Delaware, sells products (i.e., generic drugs) through
distributors in the state, and frequently litigates in Delaware courts,22 Mylan
challenged whether such contacts were sufficient to render it “at home” in the
state.23 Mylan also argued that it was not subject to specific jurisdiction because
it had not yet sold the products at issue in Delaware or anywhere else.24 Rather,
it had only filed an ANDA.25
The district courts both agreed, post-Daimler, that Mylan was no longer
subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware based on its continuous and
systematic business contacts with the state.26 Yet, because the Delaware
Supreme Court had long-held that registering to do business in the state
constitutes consent to general jurisdiction,27 one court found that Mylan
consented to general jurisdiction in the forum.28 Moreover, even though Mylan
had limited contacts with Delaware beyond its registration to do business, both
courts found Mylan’s contacts with Delaware sufficient to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction.29 Accordingly, Mylan’s motions to dismiss were denied.30
17. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D. Del. 2015);
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del. 2014).
18. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577–79 (involving a patent held by Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.,
incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York); AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552
(involving a patent held by Swedish corporation AstraZeneca AB, whose American subsidiary
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP was incorporated and headquartered in Delaware).
19. Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
20. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577–79; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552.
21. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 579; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 551.
22. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577–78; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552.
23. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 576; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552–54.
24. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 576; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552–53.
25. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 576–77; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552, 554.
26. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 576; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 554.
27. Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1115–16 (Del. 1988); but see Genuine Parts Co. v.
Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 148 (Del. Apr. 18, 2016) (reviewing Sternberg “in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s clarification of the due-process limits on general jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler,”
and concluding that Delaware’s registration statutes “provid[e] a means for service of process and
[do] not confer[] general jurisdiction”).
28. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 587; but see AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556–57 (concluding
that Mylan did not consent to jurisdiction simply by registering to do business in Delaware).
29. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 597; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 560.
30. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 599; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 560.
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In light of the important questions raised by these cases, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted interlocutory review.31 In Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 32 (“Acorda II”), the majority
declined to reach the general jurisdiction question but found that Mylan was
subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware on a theory of specific jurisdiction
alone.33 Although the Federal Circuit declined to review the decision en banc,34
Mylan petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari on September 19, 2016.35
While Acorda II raises important questions regarding both general and
specific jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman cases, a number of scholars are already
discussing the issue of general jurisdiction.36 Thus, this Comment focuses only
on the specific jurisdiction findings in Acorda II and the Delaware cases leading
up to it, while also proposing a way forward in subsequent Hatch-Waxman
cases.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and policies underlying the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Part II describes personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as it
stands in the United States today. Part III explains how the personal jurisdiction
analysis differs in Hatch-Waxman cases. In Part IV, this Comment discusses
the two Delaware cases and the Federal Circuit’s decision in Acorda II. Part V
analyzes the Federal Circuit’s reasoning and argues that the standards for
specific personal jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman cases should be relaxed in
response to the recent tightening of general jurisdiction requirements.
I. THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
A. The Regulatory Environment before Hatch-Waxman
Like other inventions, pharmaceuticals are afforded patent protection if
certain requirements are satisfied. Specifically, the inventor—the “pioneer”37—
must prove that the pharmaceutical has proper subject matter, that it has utility,

31. Acorda Therapeutics v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 759 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
32. 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
33. Id. at 757.
34. See Kevin Penton, Full Fed. Circ. Won’t Review Generics Jurisdiction Ruling, LAW360
(June 21, 2016, 12:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/809105/full-fed-circ-won-t-reviewgenerics-jurisdiction-ruling.
35. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics Inc., ——- U.S. ——- (2016).
36. See, e.g., Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and
General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1622–23 (2015)
(considering whether registration to do business in a state constitutes consent to general jurisdiction
and citing the Acorda I and AstraZeneca cases); see also Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes,
General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1358–59 (2015)
(same); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium:
Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 643, 661–66 (2015) (same).
37. See Takeda Pharm., U.S.A., Inc. v. Burwell, 78 F. Supp. 3d 65, 71 (D.D.C. 2015).
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and that it is new, non-obvious, and adequately disclosed.38 If the requirements
are met and a patent is issued, the drug is afforded patent protection for a limited
period of time.39 As a result, the patent owner can prevent others, including
producers of less expensive “generic” drugs “from making, using, offering to
sell, or selling” products that infringe during the patent term.40 However,
patenting is just the first step of a long process that a pioneering drug company
must take before marketing pharmaceutical products.
Enacted in 1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)41
empowered the FDA to review all “new drugs” for safety before authorizing
release to the general public,42 setting the modern regulatory framework for the
pharmaceutical industry.43 The legislation required manufacturers to submit a
new drug application (NDA) to the FDA when seeking authorization and to
support their application with the results of scientific testing to prove the safety
of the product.44 Moreover, testing information was kept confidential out of
concern that the publication of testing results would de-incentivize innovators
from bringing new drugs to market by handing competitors a blueprint to create
similar versions of the drug at a significantly lower cost.45
In 1962, Congress amended the FDCA,46 increasing the burden on drug
manufacturers to show effectiveness in addition to safety.47 The new standard
generally required two or more “adequate and well-controlled clinical
investigations” to show that the drug was significantly beneficial to customers.48
However, because efficacy testing was time-consuming, these new laws limited
the time pioneering drug manufacturers were allotted to profit on new drugs

38. See Joshua McGuire, Nonobviousness: Limitations on Evidentiary Support, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 175 (2003).
39. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 350. In 1995, the general length of patent terms was modified
from 17 to 20 years from the date the patent application was filed. See id. See also 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(2) (2012). However, this general patent term is subject to some exceptions. In particular,
pharmaceutical patents may be extended beyond 20 years to include the time the company lost to
testing and the FDA approval process. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
41. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012)).
42. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 587; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
43. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 587.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
47. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 588 (defining the requirement as demanding proof
that the drug was “effective for its intended use, i.e., that the drug provided some health benefit to
the consumer”).
48. Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and
Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250 (May 8, 1970) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R pts. 130, 146); see Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 588.
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during the lives of the underlying patents.49 Consequently, the legislation
significantly reduced incentives for companies to undertake drug innovation and
scientific testing.50
Generic companies also faced many hurdles when bringing their products to
market. Accordingly, in 1970, the FDA implemented the ANDA process to
approve generic drugs if those drugs were shown to be similarly safe and
effective to their pioneer counterparts.51 However, eligible products were
limited to generic drugs approved prior to 1962 and reviewed under the rigorous
Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program.52 In 1980, the FDA initiated the
“paper-NDA” process by which generic manufacturers could prove safety and
efficacy by supplementing their application with reliable publicly-available
information rather than with the results of costly scientific testing.53 Yet,
manufacturers remained hesitant to bring generic drugs to market because there
was so little reliable data publicly available.54 In 1984, the Federal Circuit
provided the last straw with its decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.,55 in which it concluded that any unauthorized use—even
experimental use for federally mandated testing—of a patented drug by a generic
manufacturer before patent expiration constituted infringement.56 With so few
generic products entering the market57 and the average price of drugs
skyrocketing, Congress decided that increasing pharmaceutical competition was
necessary.58
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
With the introduction of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984,59 or the Hatch-Waxman Act,60 Congress sought to
balance “two competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and
49. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 588.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 589.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 589–90.
55. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 860–61; see also THOMAS, supra note 1, at 10–12.
57. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (referencing 1984 congressional
testimony indicating the existence of 150 off-patent pioneer drugs without generic competitors, and
only fifteen paper-NDAs filed for generic versions of pioneer drugs approved by the FDA after
1962).
58. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 590.
59. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b; 21
U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc; 28 U.S.C. § 2201; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)).
60. The Act is named after its congressional co-sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and
Representative Henry Waxman. See H. REP. NO. 98-857 (Pt. II), at 3 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-547,
at 1 (1984); see also AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 60, 89 (D.D.C. 2012).
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development of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost,
generic copies of those drugs to market.”61 To achieve its first goal, the Act
extended the patent term for pharmaceuticals to make up for lost time due to
FDA review, and introduced exclusivity periods for certain drug innovations.62
To accomplish the second, the Act made significant changes to the drug approval
process, allowing generics to piggyback on the pioneer’s safety and efficacy
testing results during the NDA approval process,63 so long as the generic
demonstrated that its version was the “bioequivalent” of the pioneer drug.64
In addition, the Act established a means for resolving disputes between patentholders (i.e., pioneers) and prospective patent-infringers (i.e., generics) prior to
the release of the generic product into the market.65 Specifically, it required the
FDA to maintain and periodically publish a list of all approved drugs and their
related patents for both new and generic products.66 Thus, the FDA created the
“Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” known
more commonly as the “Orange Book.”67
Under the Act, a manufacturer filing an ANDA for a generic version of a
pioneer drug is not only required to provide evidence of bioequivalence,68 it
must also make one of four “certifications” with respect to each patent for the
pioneer drug in the Orange Book.69 Specifically, the generic must certify:
(I) that there are no patents listed in the Orange Book for the drug (a
“Paragraph I” certification); (II) that the relevant patents have expired
(a “Paragraph II” certification); (III) that the generic manufacturer will
not seek approval of the ANDA until after expiration of the relevant
patent (a “Paragraph III” certification); or (IV) that such a patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the

61. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
62. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1590, 1598 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii); 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012)); see also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra
note 3, at 590, 592.
63. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1593 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2012));
see also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 585, 593.
64. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1586 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv)
(2012)); see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 423.
65. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 595.
66. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1592 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012));
see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 422.
67. Kelly, supra note 3, at 422.
68. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012); see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 423 (explaining
that the generic company must show that “(1) the active ingredient of the generic drug is the same
as that of the pioneer drug; (2) the generic drug has the same route of administration, dosage form
and strength as the pioneer drug; and (3) the generic drug’s labeling [is the] same as the labeling of
the pioneer drug”).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012); see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 423.
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new drug for which the ANDA is submitted (a “Paragraph IV”
certification).70
Paragraph I, II, and III certifications are generally uncontroversial,71 but a
Paragraph IV certification often leads to significant litigation.72 By making this
certification, the generic indicates that it (1) intends to release its drug into the
market during the pioneer’s patent term,73 and (2) believes the release is
appropriate because the pioneer’s patent is either invalid—meaning the patent
never should have been granted in the first place—or will not be infringed by
the generic’s product.74 Consequently, an ANDA filer making a Paragraph IV
certification is required to notify patent owners of the certification75 and to state
the “factual and legal basis of [its] opinion . . . that the patent is invalid or will
not be infringed.”76
Additionally, the Act made two modifications to the law governing which
actions constitute patent infringement by generics.77 First, it overturned the
Bolar decision, which had held that the “limited use of a patented drug for testing
and investigation strictly related to FDA drug approval requirements”
constituted patent infringement,78 generating a rule known today as the “Bolar
Amendment.”79 Second, the Act established that the mere filing of an ANDA
with a Paragraph IV certification constitutes an “artificial” act of infringement,80
and thus, created the factual basis for a patent infringement suit between generics
and pioneers.81 In other words, the generic’s act of filing an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification generates an actual case or controversy sufficient for
either the pioneer company to sue for patent infringement or for the generic
company to sue for declaratory relief in federal court.82
Congress also included certain provisions in the Act to incentivize
litigation83—the idea being that Congress wanted courts to resolve questions
70. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 600 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
75. Kelly, supra note 3, at 423.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2012).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)–(2) (2012); see Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 604–05.
78. Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012); see Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 605.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
81. Id.; Kelly, supra note 3, at 424.
82. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2012); see also Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic
Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 245, 264 (2012). Federal courts have exclusive subject matter over all patent cases.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also THOMAS, supra note 1, at 5.
83. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 17–18. ANDA filers must notify the patent-holder of an ANDA
submission with a Paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (2012). After receiving
notice, the patent-holder has 45 days to bring a suit for patent infringement. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).

2016]

Personal Jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman Cases

197

about patent validity and infringement related to pioneer drugs.84 From the
pioneer’s perspective, filing a lawsuit is beneficial under the Act because it
slows down the ANDA approval process.85 Moreover, Congress provided
important incentives to encourage generic companies to file ANDAs with
Paragraph IV certifications. Specifically, under the Act, the first generic
company to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification and invalidate the
pioneer’s patent is granted a six-month period of marketing exclusivity,86 during
which time the generic and pioneer companies are the only providers.87
A generic company can make a substantial amount of profit during six months
of exclusivity,88 and thus, pharmaceutical patent litigation can be a high stakes
game.89 Accordingly, companies must be strategic before filing suits. One very
important part of that calculus is where to file the suit, which depends in part on
where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Pennoyer v. Neff,90 courts have sought
to clarify the power they have under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants in a suit.91 Yet, it took nearly
seventy years after Pennoyer for the Supreme Court to begin to refine the scope
of jurisdictional authority.92 In the canonical case International Shoe Company
v. Washington,93 the Court took important steps towards defining the scope of
personal jurisdiction, and in the process, created the two broad categories of
If it complies with this requirement, the FDA will suspend approving the ANDA until either the
litigation is resolved in favor of the ANDA filer, the patent term expires, or 30 months from the
date notice was received. Id. Moreover, if the patent-holder fails to bring a suit within 45 days,
the ANDA filer may bring a declaratory judgment action against the patent-holder regarding the
validity of the patent. Id. at §§ 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(I)–(II); see also THOMAS, supra note 1, at 24.
84. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 434.
85. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(I)–(II) (2012); see also AstraZeneca
AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558 (D. Del. 2014).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
87. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 424 (“FDA will not approve subsequent ANDAs for the same
pioneer drug until the expiration of the 180 days.”).
88. Id. at 424–25.
89. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 82, at 252 (remarking that companies in the pharmaceutical
industry are highly “dependent on patent protection to recoup [their] enormous research,
development, regulatory, and post-marketing costs”).
90. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (finding that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established”).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”); see also Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 62–63 (2010) (explaining that “the
jurisdiction of courts considering state law cases is constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment,
while the Fifth Amendment limits jurisdiction in patent and other federal question cases”).
92. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
93. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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personal jurisdiction that form the basis of nearly every personal jurisdiction
inquiry today: general and specific jurisdiction.94 In International Shoe, the
State of Washington brought suit in state court against a non-resident defendant
corporation for failure to contribute to the state’s unemployment fund.95 The
corporation, incorporated in Delaware and principally operating out of Missouri,
employed eleven to thirteen salesmen in Washington but had otherwise limited
operations in the state.96 As Pennoyer had established the principle that a
defendant must be present in a forum for the court to render a judgment
personally binding him,97 the Court engaged in an examination of what
constitutes a corporation’s “presence” within a forum.98
First, the Court reasoned that a corporate defendant’s “presence” has “never
been doubted” in a forum in which a corporation’s activities are “continuous and
systematic.”99 From this passage, the doctrine of general jurisdiction was
born.100 Next, it determined that where a defendant’s activities in a forum are
not “continuous and systematic,” but instead “irregular” or “casual,”101 due
process requires only that the defendant have minimum suit-related contacts
with the forum, so long as maintenance of the suit is consistent with “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”102 This concept of “minimum
contacts” eventually became the cornerstone for the doctrine of specific
jurisdiction.103
A. General Personal Jurisdiction
After International Shoe, the Supreme Court revisited general jurisdiction on
only a few occasions, leaving “systematic and continuous” as an enigmatic
governing standard for several decades.104 However, by 2011, the Court finally
began to refine the scope of the doctrine for corporations.105 In Goodyear, two
13 year-old boys from North Carolina were killed in a bus accident in Paris,
France.106 The boys’ parents sued Goodyear, the manufacturer of the bus’s tires,
specifically naming Goodyear’s American parent company and three of its

94. Id. at 317, 319.
95. Id. at 311.
96. Id. at 313–14.
97. Id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
98. Id. at 316–21.
99. Id. at 317.
100. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317).
101. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
102. Id. at 316.
103. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923 (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).
104. Id. at 925.
105. Id. at 919.
106. Id. at 918.
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foreign subsidiaries as defendants in North Carolina state court.107 Goodyear’s
American parent company did not challenge the exercise of jurisdiction because
it had established manufacturing operations in North Carolina and had regularly
engaged in commercial activity there.108 However, the foreign subsidiaries
sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction because they had no business
relations or manufacturing operations in North Carolina, and the tires at issue
had never been distributed in the state.109 Finding the foreign subsidiaries’
arguments persuasive, the Court ruled that a corporate defendant will only be
subject to a state’s exercise of general jurisdiction when the corporation’s
contacts with the state are so “continuous and systematic” that the corporation
is “essentially at home” there.110 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the
North Carolina court’s exercise of general jurisdiction was inappropriate, as the
foreign subsidiaries were “in no sense at home in North Carolina.”111
Three years later, in Daimler, the Supreme Court clarified that a corporation
is “essentially at home” in two locations: (1) where it is incorporated, and (2)
where it has its principle place of business.112 According to the Court’s finding
in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,113 a corporation’s principle place of business exists at
its metaphorical “nerve center,” which is generally found at the corporation’s
headquarters.114 With this set of cases, the Supreme Court significantly curtailed
the reach of general jurisdiction, forcing plaintiffs in many cases to turn to
specific jurisdiction as the grounds for suing defendants in their chosen forum.115
B. The Specific Personal Jurisdiction Inquiry
During the decades of relatively stagnant growth in general jurisdiction
jurisprudence,116 specific jurisdiction had “become the centerpiece of modern
jurisdictional theory” in the years following International Shoe.117 Through a
series of cases,118 the Supreme Court layered several inquiries on top of the

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 921.
110. Id. at 919.
111. Id. at 929.
112. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
113. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
114. Id. at 80–81 (“[W]e conclude that the phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to the
place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s
activities.”).
115. See, e.g., supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text.
116. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 925 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
117. Id. at 924–25 (quoting Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 610, 628 (1988)).
118. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
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traditional “minimum contacts” analysis, giving courts a framework to consider
“the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” when
determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant is
appropriate.119
Under this framework, first, the litigation must “arise out of or relate to” the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.120
Often referred to as the
“connectedness,”121 “relatedness,”122 or “nexus”123 requirement, this prong
considers the connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and the
plaintiff’s claim.124 Second, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself
of the privileges of the forum, thereby receiving the benefits and protections
afforded under the State’s laws.125 Third, the exercise of specific jurisdiction
must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.126 To
make such a determination, a defendant’s contacts may be balanced against a set
of factors: the defendant’s burden, the state’s interest in the dispute, the
plaintiff’s interest in convenience and effective relief, the judicial system’s
interest in efficiency, and the shared state interest in furthering social policies.127
Upon a “lesser showing” of minimum contacts, the existence of these
considerations in favor of a plaintiff may “serve to establish the reasonableness
of jurisdiction.”128 But when a defendant’s purposeful availment of a forum is
more clearly established, a defendant may only defeat jurisdiction by presenting
a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair.129
286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957).
119. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
120. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8.
121. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 230–31 (2014).
122. See Ryne H. Ballou, Note, Civil Procedure – Be More Specific: Vague Precedents and
the Differing Standards by Which to Apply “Arises out of or Relates to” in the Test for Specific
Personal Jurisdiction, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 663, 667–68 (2013); Flavio Rose,
Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The “But for” Test, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
1545, 1546 (1994).
123. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific
Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343, 348–73 (2005).
124. Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994).
125. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
126. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citing Int’l Shoe Co.,
326 U.S. at 320).
127. Id. at 476 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
128. Id. at 477.
129. Id. at 477–78 (“[M]inimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and
substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has
purposefully engaged in forum activities. As we have previously noted, jurisdictional rules may not
be employed in such a way as to make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient that a party
unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).

2016]

Personal Jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman Cases

201

C. Unanswered Questions in the “Nexus” Context
Though the second and third prongs of the specific jurisdiction analysis
(purposeful availment and fairness, respectively) have been the subject of much
litigation and, at least in some respects, are well-settled areas of law,130 the
Supreme Court has said comparatively little about the nexus requirement and
has explicitly left it open to interpretation.131
1. The Supreme Court’s Approach in Helicopteros
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,132 a Colombian
corporation that provided helicopter transportation services in South America
was sued in Texas by the families of four American citizens who died in a crash
in Peru.133 Although the company held business negotiations, purchased
helicopters, and sent pilots to train in Texas,134 the plaintiffs relied exclusively
on a general jurisdiction theory, leaving the Court room to decide the case only
on those grounds.135 The Court ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the
defendant corporation lacked sufficient contacts with Texas to subject it to
general jurisdiction in the state.136
Yet, the Court made it a point to note that its decision left some issues about
specific jurisdiction—and, in particular, the nexus requirement—unsettled. In a
footnote, the Court raised and then declined to answer the questions (1) whether
“arise out of or relate to” refers to two different types of connections between
the litigation and the defendant’s contacts, (2) what type of connection is
necessary to satisfy either one, and (3) if a situation occurs which implicates the
“relate to” language alone, whether a court’s assertion of specific jurisdiction
would be appropriate in that case.137 In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized
the Court’s unwillingness to distinguish between the two types of

130. In Asahi, the Supreme Court split over whether the purposeful availment prong could be
“premised on the placement of a product into the stream-of-commerce,” with Justice Brennan’s
faction determining that mere awareness that the product would end up in the forum was sufficient
and Justice O’Connor’s plurality concluding that a defendant must also purposefully serve the
market in the forum in some manner. Asahi Metal. Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 104, 112, 117 (1987).
131. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 n.10 (1984).
132. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
133. Id. at 409–10.
134. Id. at 410–11.
135. Id. at 414 n.9 (“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”).
136. Id. at 418.
137. Id. at 414 n.9; see also Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994)
(considering whether “the two halves of the relatedness requirement are merely two ways of
expressing the same thought or . . . meant to import different values into the jurisdictional
equation”).
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connections.138 Specifically, he argued that limiting specific jurisdiction to
actions arising immediately from the defendant’s contacts with the forum would
unjustifiably “subject constitutional standards under the Due Process Clause to
the vagaries of the substantive law or pleading requirements of each State.”139
2. Differing Approaches in the Wake of Helicopteros
Unsurprisingly, lower courts have significantly differed in their approaches to
the nexus questions posed in Helicopteros.140 Yet, these questions remain
unresolved three decades after Helicopteros was decided because, before
Goodyear and Daimler, plaintiffs and courts could rely on broad theories of
general jurisdiction.141 But given the recent constriction of general jurisdiction,
some predict the emergence of the nexus requirement “as the central
battleground in personal jurisdiction.”142
At least one circuit employs a “proximate cause” test,143 which is considered
one of the more restrictive approaches.144 Borrowing from tort law causation
standards, the test asks whether a reasonable person would have foreseen that
the defendant’s activities would produce the injury.145 Effectively, however, the
test derives from the “arise out of” language alone.146 Consequently, support for
the rigid standard has waned.147 Some circuits apply the less rigorous, but still
quite restrictive, “but for” test,148 whereby specific jurisdiction exists if the
injury would not have occurred “but for” the defendant’s activities in the
forum.149 Broader than proximate cause,150 the test requires courts to consider
all necessary antecedent causes of the injury, not just the immediate cause.151

138. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 427; see also Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (interpreting the Helicopteros nexus standard by citing Justice Brennan’s dissent
and emphasizing that the “constitutional catch-phrase is disjunctive in nature”).
140. See Victor N. Metallo, “Arise out of” or “Related to”: Textualism and Understanding
Precedent Through Interpretatio Objectificata, “Objectified Interpretation” – A Four Step Process
to Resolve Jurisdiction Questions Utilizing the Third Circuit Test in O’Connor as a Uniform
Standard,” 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 415, 416–17 (2011).
141. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 121, at 213–14.
142. Id. at 228.
143. See Nowak v. Tak How Invs, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996); Metallo, supra note
140, at 417.
144. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 121, at 232.
145. Id.
146. Metallo, supra note 140, at 416–17.
147. See Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 912–13 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a strict
proximate cause test and adopting a more flexible standard that considers the totality of the
circumstances).
148. Metallo, supra note 140, at 417–18.
149. Simard, supra note 123, at 356.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Several circuits remove causation from the analysis and use a more permissive
“sliding scale” or “hybrid” approach instead.152 This test considers the totality
of the circumstances,153 balancing the closeness of the contacts to the claim with
the quality and quantity of those contacts, so that the more related they are, the
less quality and quantity is required.154
Some scholars have advocated for the “substantive relevance” test, whereby
the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate if the defendant’s forum
contacts “bear on the substantive legal dispute between the parties,” meaning
that the contacts would normally be alleged as part of the complaint.155 Others
have suggested a “similarity test,” which compares the defendant’s contacts in
the forum with his contacts in another state.156 The similarity test is grounded in
the theory that a defendant engaging in similar activities across multiple forums
should expect the exercise of jurisdiction in all of them.157 This approach is
considered the most lenient standard.158
Other courts simply require proof of a “substantial connection” between the
defendant’s contacts with the forum and the litigation.159 In fact, the Supreme
Court recently utilized this language in Walden v. Fiore,160 a personal
jurisdiction case decided just two terms ago. That said, Walden was what is
known as an “effects test” case, so it is unclear whether Walden’s “substantial
connection” test applies to a traditional minimum contacts analysis.161 In any
152. Metallo, supra note 140, at 418, 434.
153. Id. at 418; see Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994); see
also Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 912–13 (8th Cir. 2012).
154. Lawrence W. Moore, The Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction, 37 IDAHO L. REV.
583, 593 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, The Relatedness Problem].
155. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 121, at 231–32. The test considers the required
geographical components relevant for asserting the cause of action, rather than the location of the
injury. Id. at 231. For example, in one case, though the New York long-arm statute granted
jurisdiction over airplane pilots involved in a collision because both planes had stopped over at an
airport in New York, the court found that the stopover was not of “substantive relevance” to the
suit because the complaint did not state that any negligence had occurred during that time. Lea
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP.
CT. REV. 77, 83.
156. Simard, supra note 123, at 367.
157. Id. at 368. Under this test, for example, a driver traveling from Connecticut to Maine
(through Massachusetts and New Hampshire) who gets in an accident in Massachusetts could be
subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, New Hampshire, or Maine because
his contacts were similar to the contacts giving rise to the suit in Massachusetts. Id. at 368-69.
158. Id. at 367; see also Brilmayer, supra note 158, at 83–84.
159. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 121, at 233.
160. 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).
161. In Walden, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the “effects test,” a doctrine the
Court first introduced in Calder v. Jones. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–26 (reviewing Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). The test considers whether a defendant can be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the forum where the plaintiff feels the “effects” of the defendant’s intentionally
tortious conduct. Lee Goldman, From Calder to Walden and Beyond: The Proper Application of
the “Effects Test” in Personal Jurisdiction Cases, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 358 (2015). In
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event, Walden stated (1) that a defendant’s “suit-related conduct” must create a
“substantial connection” with the forum,162 and (2) that this connection “must
arise out of” the defendant’s contacts with the forum.163 But the Court did not
explain what, if any, effect this “substantial connection” test has on the “arise
out of or relate to” nexus test articulated in Helicopteros.164 Thus, until the Court
provides additional clarification, the “substantial connection” appears to be less
like an independent nexus test, and more like a general restatement of the
Helicopteros rule.
3. The Federal Circuit’s Approach to the Nexus Requirement
Prior to Acorda II, the Federal Circuit never explicitly adopted one of the tests
enumerated above, though it hinted that it favored a more permissive approach,
specifically within the context of patent infringement actions.165 The Circuit
first addressed the issue in 1995 in Akro Corp. v. Luker.166 In Akro, the court
noted that the Supreme Court purposefully left the “arise from or relate to”
language open for interpretation, reasoning that its disjunctive nature was of
significance.167 In the court’s view, the Supreme Court must have intended a
more flexible interpretation than a strict “arise out of” standard.168 To reach a
conclusion in the case, the court considered whether the quantity, quality, and
nature of the defendant’s contacts with the forum were substantial enough to
warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.169 In other words, the court
Walden, the Court ultimately concluded that the defendant could not be subject to personal
jurisdiction in Nevada solely on the basis that he “directed his [tortious] conduct at plaintiffs whom
he knew had Nevada connections,” because “it is the defendant, not the plaintiff . . . , who must
create contacts with the forum State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125–26.
162. Id. at 1121 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added).
164. See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107, 157 (2015) (“The Walden Court ultimately failed to provide
guidance to lower courts regarding whether a defendant has the requisite ‘substantial connections’
with the forum, . . . [instead] obscur[ing] the basis for the decision, continu[ing] the ambiguity that
has characterized the Court’s minimum contacts analysis, and provid[ing] no principled basis for
lower courts to assess subsequent cases.”); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 121, at 234–35 (“The
‘substantial connection’ model . . . offers no meaningful tutelage [and] engenders conflicting
holdings . . . .”).
165. See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Red Wing Shoe Co., Inc.
v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45
F.3d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
166. Akro, 45 F.3d at 1544.
167. Id. at 1547 (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994)).
168. Id. (quoting Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 206); see also Inamed, 249 F.3d at 1362 (confirming
the Akro flexibility approach as authoritative in the Federal Circuit).
169. Akro, 45 F.3d at 1547–48 (quoting B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 594,
598–99 (8th Cir. 1973)) ("It is evident . . . that the quantity, quality and nature of the defendant's
contacts with the jurisdiction are substantial . . . . [I]n view of the defendant's extensive contacts
with the forum, we believe that the contacts are sufficiently connected with the cause of action to
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apparently applied a totality of the circumstances test (a “sliding scale” or
“hybrid” approach).
After Akro, the Federal Circuit did not stray from its permissive interpretation
of nexus,170 though it suggested that its feelings on the subject were not
completely settled.171 Still, because Federal Circuit law is authoritative over the
regional circuits in the patent context—even when considering personal
jurisdiction, so long as the issue relates to substantive patent law172—the Akro
test should have been the standard around the country.173 However, because
courts have historically relied on general jurisdiction in ANDA cases,174 a
definitive interpretation of the nexus requirement in the Hatch-Waxman context
has never been given.
III. APPLICATIONS OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION IN HATCH-WAXMAN CASES
A. Specific Jurisdiction in Patent Infringement Cases
For years, the “situs” of patent injuries, and thereby, one of the forums in
which an infringement suit could be brought, was an ambiguous legal concept,175
drifting between the competing theories of “injury at the place of patent” and
“injury at the place of infringing acts.”176 However, in Beverly Hills Fan, Co. v.
Royal Sovereign Corp.,177 the question was resolved in favor of the latter
approach.178 In Beverly Hills Fan, a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in California brought a patent infringement suit in the Eastern

satisfy due process.") (emphasis removed); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Synthon Holding, B.V., 386 F.
Supp. 2d 666, 675 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (recognizing that Federal Circuit personal jurisdiction law
governs patent cases and identifying the nexus test applied by the Akro court).
170. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
see also Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
171. Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1336–37 (“While we are bound by our precedent, it is not without
controversy . . . Our own interpretation of the ‘arise out of or related to’ language is far more
permissive than either the ‘proximate cause’ or the ‘but for’ analyses . . . . However, we need not
confront the [issue] in the case at hand . . . .”).
172. Akro, 45 F.3d at 1543; Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558,
1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
173. See, e.g., Pfizer, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
174. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (listing pre-Daimler and pre-Goodyear ANDA
cases decided on general jurisdiction grounds).
175. John C. O’Quinn, Note, There’s No Place Like Home: Finding Personal Jurisdiction in
ANDA Patent Cases After Zeneca v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 129, 129
(1999); see also Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1570 (finding that a precedent-setting Seventh Circuit
decision could be read to hold “that the injury occurred where infringing sales were made . . . [but
could] also be read to mean that the situs of the injury is the situs of the intangible property interest,
which is determined by where the patent owner resides”).
176. O’Quinn, supra note 175, at 129.
177. 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
178. O’Quinn, supra note 175, at 129–30.
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District of Virginia.179 The patent owner named as defendants a Chinese ceiling
fan manufacturer and the New Jersey corporation that imported and distributed
the fans throughout the United States.180 The defendants were not incorporated
or headquartered in Virginia and had not established agents for service of
process or obtained licenses to do business in the state.181 Yet, the plaintiff sued
in Virginia federal court on the grounds that the defendants’ infringing products
were placed into the stream of commerce, and sold to Virginia customers.182
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court’s exercise of
specific jurisdiction over the defendants was appropriate because “the situs of
the injury is the location, or locations, at which the infringing activity directly
impacts on the interests of the patentee” and “the place of the infringing sales
[was] Virginia.”183 Several months later, in North American Philips Corp. v.
American Vending Sales, Inc.,184 the Federal Circuit expanded its definition of
infringing activity to include “the making, using, or selling of an infringing
article.”185 Thus, unless it would be unfair or unreasonable, defendants in most
patent infringement cases will be subject to personal jurisdiction anywhere that
they make, use, or sell the allegedly infringing products, which is often every
state in the country.186

179. Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1559–60.
180. Id. at 1560.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1560, 1564.
183. Id. at 1571; see also O’Quinn, supra note 175, at 130. The court also determined that the
exercise of jurisdiction fell within the parameters of Virginia’s “long-arm” statute. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-328.1 (1992) (allowing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant that causes an
injury within the state and derives substantial revenue from the sale of goods within the state).
When a court reaches beyond its territorial borders to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, it is said to be exercising “long-arm” jurisdiction. Douglas D. McFarland,
Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV.
491, 493 (2004). In the wake of International Shoe, all states have enacted long-arm statutes which
add an additional inquiry to the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, whereby a court must ask
first whether the court’s exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by the statute before inquiring into its
harmony with due process. Id. at 493–96. Some statutes extend jurisdiction to the “limits of due
process,” while others restrict it to non-residents that have engaged in a specific set of enumerated
acts. Id. at 496–97. Though Virginia has an enumerated-act statute, courts have construed the
statute to reach to the limits of due process. Id. at 526–27.
184. 35 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
185. Id. at 1579.
186. See Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 6, at 894–95.
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B. Specific Jurisdiction in Pharmaceutical Patent Cases
After Daimler,187 the test for general jurisdiction is the same in
pharmaceutical patent infringement cases as in any other.188 A court may only
exercise general jurisdiction over the defendant corporation if it is “essentially
at home” in the forum state189—that is, where the corporation is incorporated or
headquartered.190 Thus, plaintiffs can no longer rely on a “doing business”
theory of general jurisdiction, and must establish instead either that the
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in some other way191 or that the
defendant is subject to specific jurisdiction.192
However, analyzing specific jurisdiction in the Hatch-Waxman context is
complicated. As the filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification
constitutes only an “artificial” act of infringement,193 patent infringement in the
generic pharmaceutical context “is distinct from other types of patent
infringement.”194 Moreover, because the manufacture, use, or sale of the
“infringing article”195 (i.e., the generic drug) in ANDA cases is by nature not
certain to occur, determining the location of the artificial act of infringement is
particularly imprecise.196 Consequently, identifying forums that can exercise
specific jurisdiction over defendant corporations is rather difficult.197
Because all ANDA filers must submit their applications to FDA headquarters
in Rockville, Maryland,198 one likely forum seemed to be the federal courts of

187. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
188. Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 7, at 356 (“Previous justifications for general jurisdiction
that rely on an ANDA filer’s ‘substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ in a state
from sales of drugs, without more, will no longer suffice for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”).
189. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
190. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2010).
191. For example, a plaintiff might argue that a defendant consented to general jurisdiction in
a forum by registering to do business there. See, e.g., Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms.
Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587 (D. Del. 2015) (finding that Mylan had consented to general
jurisdiction in Delaware simply by registering to do business there); but see AstraZeneca AB v.
Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556–57 (D. Del. 2014) (reaching the opposite conclusion);
see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
192. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 121, at 229–30.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678
(1990).
194. O’Quinn, supra note 175, at 130 (“ANDA infringement arises from certain filings with
the FDA, rather than the ‘making, using, or selling of an infringing article’ described in North
American Philips.”).
195. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678.
196. Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 7, at 352.
197. Id. (“Specific jurisdiction . . . permits a plaintiff to hale a defendant into court where the
injury took place. Finding that district court is not always an easy task for patent holders in ANDA
litigations.”).
198. Id.; Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 268, 269 (W.D. Pa. 1997), rev’d,
173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Maryland.199 Accordingly, in Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,200
the Federal Circuit addressed whether an out-of-state defendant who merely
filed an ANDA in Maryland was subject to personal jurisdiction in that state.201
In Zeneca, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. submitted an ANDA with a Paragraph
IV certification to the FDA in Maryland, seeking approval to market a generic
version of a drug patented and owned by Zeneca Ltd., a British corporation.202
Because Mylan’s parent company was incorporated in West Virginia and
headquartered in Pennsylvania, Zeneca sued in a Pennsylvania federal court.203
A “jurisdictional ping pong match” ensued.204 On interlocutory appeal, the
Federal Circuit considered whether Maryland could exercise personal
jurisdiction over Mylan on the sole basis of Mylan’s act of filing an ANDA with
the FDA.205
Two Federal Circuit judges concluded that Maryland could not assert personal
jurisdiction over Mylan, but differed in rationale.206 Judge Rader determined
that Mylan’s activities were purposefully directed at the federal government
rather than Maryland, and thus, Mylan had not availed itself of the benefits and
protections of the forum.207 Judge Gajarsa declined to adopt Judge Rader’s
199. See Zeneca, 968 F. Supp. at 278 (granting plaintiff’s motion to transfer to the Maryland
federal district court).
200. 173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
201. Id. at 831, 834.
202. Id. at 830.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 830, 834. Zeneca successfully transferred to Maryland on the grounds that the
ANDA submission to the FDA meant Zeneca had been injured in Maryland, and that Mylan had
purposefully availed itself to the forum, even though the ANDA submission constituted Mylan’s
only contacts with the state. Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 268, 274 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (“When a defendant purposefully targets its conduct to cause harm in a forum state, it can
reasonably expect to be haled into that state’s courts. Thus, even a single contact may be sufficient
to create jurisdiction, provided that the principle of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ is observed.”).
The Maryland district court dismissed the case and sent it back to Pennsylvania for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 830.
205. Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 830–31.
206. Id. at 831, 834 (Gajarsa, J. concurring & Rader, J. concurring) (concurring in judgment
but differing as to whether or not the act of filing an ANDA generates a cause of action and, thus,
a contact with Maryland). A third judge gave a silent dissent. Id. at 834.
207. Id. at 835. Moreover, Judge Rader concluded that the act of submitting an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification did not result in a tangible injury to the patentee at all. Id. at 836.
Therefore, Mylan was not fairly warned that submitting an ANDA to the FDA might generate
litigation in the forum, and the exercise of jurisdiction was unfair. Id. With this point, Judge
Rader’s opinion seems inherently inconsistent. See O’Quinn, supra note 175, at 133–34. While
he could have reached a finding of no personal jurisdiction solely on the grounds that Mylan did
not purposefully direct its activities at Maryland, he made it a point to conclude that the submission
of an ANDA did not create a tangible injury, unlike manufacture, use, offers for sale, and sales of
infringing products, which form the basis of normal infringement actions. Id. Following this line
of reasoning, Judge Rader seems to suggest that litigation should not arise from an ANDA
submission at all, because of the “artificial” nature of the injury. Id. Yet, if “artificial” injury were
insufficient for litigation to arise, the appropriate disposition would have been dismissal for lack of
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views regarding the location of Mylan’s contacts,208 reasoning that Mylan
purposefully committed patent infringement in Maryland, and thus, the court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over Mylan.209 However, out of concern
that granting jurisdiction solely on the basis of ANDA submissions to the FDA
would create a “supercourt” for generic infringement cases,210 Judge Gajarsa
invoked the “government contacts exception,” whereby entry into a jurisdiction
for the sole purpose of petitioning a federal agency does not form a basis for
personal jurisdiction.211 Though Zeneca eliminated Maryland as a viable forum
for cases resting solely on the grounds that the ANDA was submitted to the
FDA,212 the Federal Circuit left open the possibility that additional contacts
could have existed which would have warranted the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.213
IV. ANALYZING THE ASTRAZENECA AND ACORDA I OPINIONS
Since Zeneca, other federal courts have analyzed ANDA filers’ contacts under
different theories of specific personal jurisdiction, with a somewhat mixed bag
of results.214
Two recently-decided cases in Delaware federal court,
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.215 and Acorda Therapeutics,
standing (i.e., for lack of an injury-in-fact), not personal jurisdiction. But such a conclusion
contradicts the express language of the Hatch-Waxman Act establishing an “act of infringement”
and the Supreme Court’s holding in Eli Lilly, calling it a “highly artificial act of infringement.” Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990). And moreover, if the act of submitting
an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification did not “give rise” to the litigation in Zeneca, then what
activities did is unclear.
208. Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 833–34. More specifically, Judge Gajarsa disagreed with Judge
Rader’s conclusion that the act of submitting an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification did not
create an injury. Id. Instead, he reasoned that the submission is both a “highly artificial” act of
infringement and a “real act with actual consequences,” and that more specifically, it generates a
cause of action of patent infringement in federal court. Id.
209. Id. at 830, 833–34.
210. Id. at 832 (observing that “[n]ot even Zeneca attempts to argue that the purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act was to create such a supercourt”).
211. Id. at 831–32 (reasoning that Mylan’s singular contact with Maryland was a result of its
intent to petition the government for the right to market its generic drug and a consequence of the
fact that the FDA resides in Maryland).
212. O’Quinn, supra note 175, at 135. It should be noted, however, that had it not been for his
concerns of a supercourt, Judge Gajarsa explicitly stated that Mylan did in fact have sufficient
contacts in Maryland for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Zeneca, 173 F.3d at 833–34.
Considering a third judge gave a silent dissent, had Judge Gajarsa not invoked the government
contracts exception, Maryland would likely be an appropriate forum today for most, if not all,
ANDA cases.
213. See id. at 834.
214. See Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 7, at 352–53 (determining that courts have generally
found an ANDA filer’s “intention to sell drugs within the state . . . insufficient to exercise specific
jurisdiction” but that “[p]atent holders have successfully asserted specific jurisdiction over ANDA
filers based on where the ANDA was prepared”).
215. 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del. 2014).
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Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Acorda I”),216 highlighted that the law was
far from settled.
A. AstraZeneca and Acorda I Case Facts
In AstraZeneca, Mylan filed two ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications
seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of AstraZeneca’s diabetes
medication ONGLYZA® prior to the expiration of AstraZeneca’s patents,
prompting infringement litigation.217 Though Mylan was incorporated and
headquartered in West Virginia218 and its parent incorporated and headquartered
in Pennsylvania,219 AstraZeneca filed its suit in Delaware federal district court,
where its U.S. subsidiary was incorporated and had its principal place of
business.220 Mylan had prepared both of its ANDAs in West Virginia and filed
them with the FDA in Maryland, but mailed a “notice letter” to AstraZeneca in
Delaware, informing AstraZeneca of the ANDA filing.221 Additionally, while
Mylan did not own property in Delaware, it derived substantial revenue from
product sales there, registered to do business there, and appointed an agent for
service of process222 in accordance with two Delaware statutes governing
foreign corporations seeking to do business in the state.223 In addition, Mylan
registered with the Delaware Board of Pharmacy as a licensed wholesaler and
distributor/manufacturer of pharmaceutical products.224 In the twenty years
leading up to the litigation with AstraZeneca, Mylan initiated six lawsuits in
Delaware, but defended several more in Delaware during that time.225
Acorda I presented a similar set of facts and procedural history. In that case,
Mylan filed an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification seeking FDA approval
to market a generic version of Acorda’s Ampyra®,226 a drug that treats Multiple
Sclerosis, prior to the expiration of Acorda’s patents.227 Mylan, again, was
incorporated and headquartered in West Virginia.228 It prepared its ANDA in
West Virginia, and submitted the ANDA to the FDA in Maryland.229 It also

216. 78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D. Del. 2015).
217. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 551.
218. Id. at 552.
219. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 578.
220. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552.
221. Id. at 552, 559.
222. Id. at 552.
223. Id. at 556 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 371, 376 (West 2016)).
224. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577.
225. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 555.
226. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (referring to Ampyra® as Acorda’s “flagship drug
product”).
227. Id. at 577–78.
228. Id. at 577.
229. Id. at 578.
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mailed a notice letter to Acorda at its principal place of business in New York.230
Acorda brought a patent infringement suit in federal district court in Delaware,
Acorda’s state of incorporation.231
Mylan filed a motion to dismiss in both cases on the grounds that it was not
subject to the Delaware courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction.232 Though both
district court judges ultimately decided that Mylan was subject to specific
personal jurisdiction in Delaware,233 they split on the issue of whether Mylan
consented to general personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in
Delaware.234 The general jurisdiction issue is an important one that ultimately
needs to be resolved,235 but these two cases raise key questions about specific
jurisdiction that will substantially affect Hatch-Waxman cases in the future.
B. The Delaware Courts’ Approaches to Specific Jurisdiction
Each court took a similar approach to resolving the specific jurisdiction
inquiry. First, it applied the minimum contacts analysis to Mylan’s contacts with
the State of Delaware.236 Second, it discussed the policies underlying the HatchWaxman Act and the effect that the failure to exercise personal jurisdiction in
the state would have on those policies, asking if not in Delaware, then where?237
The court in AstraZeneca began its minimum contacts analysis by engaging
in a general discussion of the unique nature of ANDA litigation.238 It recognized
that the “highly artificial” nature of the infringement generated by filing an
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification made it difficult to find a location from
230. Id. at 579.
231. Id. at 577, 579.
232. Id. at 579; AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 552 (D. Del.
2015).
233. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 592–97; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 557–60.
234. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 583–92; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 555–57.
235. It should be noted again, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court recently reversed its
long-standing rule that registration to do business in Delaware constitutes consent to general
jurisdiction in the forum. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the issue has
been resolved in Delaware. However, it still requires resolution in other jurisdictions. See generally
John D. Donovan, Jr. & Gregg L. Weiner, Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec: Business Registration and
Personal Jurisdiction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 14, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/14/genuine-parts-co-v-cepec-business-registration-andpersonal-jurisdiction/ (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court “got it right” and explaining that
“the issue is still being tested in other courts”).
236. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 592–98; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 557–60.
237. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (“[I]dentifying a physical place where Acorda is injured by
an ANDA submission is difficult, as a corporation is not a natural person, and [the] injury here is
‘highly artificial.’ Mylan argues this means Acorda is not injured anywhere. But it is more logical
to conclude that Acorda is injured, somewhere.”) (citations omitted); AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d
at 558–59 (“Mylan argues its activities are not purposefully directed at the state of Delaware, where
AstraZeneca U.S. is organized. Mylan’s argument, however, creates the untenable position that its
conduct is not directed to any jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted).
238. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 557–60.
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which the injury “arises,” but refused to accept Mylan’s “untenable” position
that the “abstract” nature of the injury meant that its conduct was not directed at
any jurisdiction.239 Rather, as Maryland was eliminated as an appropriate forum
by the Federal Circuit in Zeneca, and because the consequences of Mylan’s
conduct were suffered in Delaware, the court concluded that the only possible
alternative forum was the patent-holder’s state of residence.240 Moreover, the
court noted that Mylan had more than just “illusory” contacts241 because it had
sent its Paragraph IV certification letter to AstraZeneca in the state.242
Accordingly, it found that the cause of action arose immediately from Mylan’s
contacts in Delaware, and the first prong of the minimum contacts test—the
nexus requirement—was satisfied.243 Next, the court rejected Mylan’s argument
that it did not reasonably anticipate being haled into Delaware court because
patent litigation was integral to Mylan’s business, and thus, found that Mylan
had purposefully availaed itself of the forum.244 Finally, because Mylan was a
frequent litigator in Delaware,245 and in light of the substantial burden that would
be placed on AstraZeneca if it were forced to sue in every ANDA filer’s home
state,246 the court concluded that Delaware’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
comported with traditional fairness principles.247 Thus, the court was
“convinced” that Mylan’s acts provided contacts sufficient to support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction in Delaware.248
The Acorda I court reached the same conclusion through slightly different
means.249 First, the court determined that the litigation arose from and was
related to Mylan’s contacts that had been and were expected to be directed
towards Delaware.250 More immediately, the litigation derived from the notice
letter Mylan had sent to Acorda, a Delaware corporation that had already started
litigating disputes against generic versions of Ampyra® in the forum.251 Thus,
239. Id. at 558–59.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 559.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 558–59. The court did not consider whether Mylan’s other contacts were sufficient
to satisfy the nexus requirement’s “relate to” language, presumably because, after concluding that
Mylan’s contacts met the more demanding “arise from” language, any such determination would
have just been dicta.
244. Id. at 559.
245. Id. at 560.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 559.
249. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
250. Id. (“This suit arises from Mylan’s ANDA filing, which is a prerequisite to obtaining FDA
approval, which is necessary in order to sell Mylan’s generic product in the United States, including
in Delaware.”).
251. Id. The Acorda I court recognized the fact that Mylan’s certification letter was sent into
New York rather than Delaware, like it was in AstraZeneca. Id. at 595–96. However, it reasoned
that while mailing a notification into Delaware undoubtedly serves as a contact with the state, its
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Mylan knew or should have known that Acorda was almost certain to sue in
Delaware.252 Moreover, as Mylan had registered to do business there, had
appointed an agent for service of process there, had registered with the Delaware
Board of Pharmacy, and was a frequent litigant in the state, the court found that
Mylan had purposefully directed its activities at Delaware.253 Finally, finding
Mylan’s burden slight given its frequent presence in the state, Delaware’s
interest significant given its ongoing relationship with Acorda, and Acorda’s
interest substantial given the location of other Ampyra® litigation, the court
concluded that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was fair and reasonable.254
C. Framing the Issues in Acorda II
Acorda I and AstraZeneca presented the Federal Circuit with a gluttony of
issues, manifested by a schizophrenic line of questioning at oral argument.255
Yet, the richest set of questions existed in the specific jurisdiction context.
Across both cases, Mylan’s uncontroverted contacts within Delaware were
relatively consistent.256 Mylan registered to do business and appointed an agent
for service of process in Delaware, and registered with the Delaware Board of
Pharmacy.257 It had previously sold drugs in the state, and had been involved in
other lawsuits there as well.258 Mylan filed ANDAs with respect to patents
owned by two Delaware companies, and sent notice to AstraZeneca in
Delaware—though it sent notice to Acorda in New York.259 Beyond that,
Mylan’s contacts were a bit more controversial.
One potential contact with Delaware was debatable—that is, the location
where the infringement occurred.260 The Federal Circuit could have decided that
the submission of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification creates an
artificial act of infringement in every state where the patent-holder sells any of

absence does not eliminate the possibility of suit there. Id. at 596. In particular, the Acorda I court
found that, by filing the ANDA, Mylan caused an injury to Acorda which was felt in its state of
incorporation, Delaware. Id.
252. Id. at 593.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 595.
255. Oral Argument, Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.
Del. 2015) (No. 2015-1456), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20151456.mp3); Oral Argument, AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del.
2014) (No. 2015-1460), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1460.mp3.
256. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552.
257. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 577; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552.
258. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552, 555.
259. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 579; AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 552, 559.
260. Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 596 (“[I]t seems logical to conclude that the state of
incorporation is at least one place in which a corporation whose patents are artificially infringed by
an ANDA filing is injured. For Acorda, that is Delaware.”); AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 558
(“ANDA litigation is unlike other patent infringement litigation: The injury is abstract, making it
difficult to point to a location out of which the injury ‘arises’ for jurisdictional purposes.”).
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its drugs (including Delaware),261 or that it creates an artificial act of
infringement only in the place where the patent-holder holds the patent
(Delaware),262 or that it creates an artificial act of infringement where the generic
intends to sell, which for generic drug companies would presumably be all fifty
states.263 If the court reached any of these conclusions, the nexus requirement
would likely be satisfied under any nexus test in Hatch-Waxman cases, because
the injury would likely be a contact with the forum “giving rise” to the
litigation.264 In any event, the question seemed unnecessary to decide because,
under a broad interpretation of the nexus requirement, the litigation “related to”
Mylan’s uncontroverted contacts in the forum, and thus, Mylan was subject to
specific jurisdiction in Delaware.
D. The Federal Circuit’s Ruling in Acorda II
A Federal Circuit panel issued one ruling for both cases on March 18, 2016.265
Giving the opinion of the court, Judge Richard Taranto decided the cases on
specific jurisdiction grounds alone.266 More critically, the analysis turned
substantially upon Mylan’s contacts under the nexus requirement.267 However,
the court declined to adopt a particular nexus test, avoiding the Helicopteros
language almost entirely and relying instead on the ambiguous requirements

261. This finding has been reached in other infringement contexts. For instance, a New York
court recently found that the uploading of a copyrighted work to the Internet creates an act of
copyright infringement in every state where the copyrighted work is sold, because it could be
downloaded anywhere. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 163–64
(N.Y. 2011).
262. This seemed less likely before Acorda II because of the Federal Circuit’s holding in
Beverly Hills Fan, which concluded that a patent holder suffers the infringement injury in the place
where competing sales are made, not where the patent is held, though that case is distinguishable
because it did not involve an ANDA-created infringement. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, in Acorda I, the court found that
the “highly artificial” infringement injury generated by submission of an ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification must occur somewhere, and that, given the Supreme Court’s holding in Daimler
that a corporation is “at home” where incorporated, it “seems logical to conclude that the state of
incorporation is at least one place in which a corporation whose patents are artificially infringed by
an ANDA filing is injured.” Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 596.
263. This approach also seemed a bit unlikely to be favored by the Federal Circuit in Acorda
II because intent to make future sales seems rather difficult to quantify.
264. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (finding that defendants were subject to
personal jurisdiction in a forum because their intentional out-of-forum conduct was “calculated to
cause injury” to the plaintiff in the forum, even though they had no other relevant contacts there);
but see Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 & n.9 (2014) (reasoning that “[t]he proper question
is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s
conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way[,]” but leaving open the question whether
a defendant’s conduct and “virtual ‘presence’” in a forum could translate into contacts).
265. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
266. Id. at 757.
267. Id. at 759–63.
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from Walden that a defendant’s “suit-related” conduct must create a “substantial
connection” with the forum.268
At the crux of the court’s “substantial connection” analysis was its
understanding of what filing an ANDA means in practical terms.269 ANDA
filings, it reasoned, are “tightly tied, in purpose and planned effect, to the
deliberate making of sales” in a generic’s intended marketing forum.270
Moreover, as the corresponding suit involves “whether that in-State activity will
infringe valid patents,” an ANDA filing is a reliable indicator of a generic’s
plans to market the drug in its intended forum.271 Thus, where intent to market
is evident, the connection would be substantial, and the conduct would be “suitrelated.”272
The court found Mylan’s intent to market in Delaware without much trouble.
In particular, Mylan registered to do business, appointed an agent for process,
and registered with the Delaware Board of Pharmacy, representing on its
certificate of registration that it “intend[ed] to engage in pharmaceutical
manufacturing, distribution and sales” in the state.273 Moreover, Mylan admitted
that it develops drugs for the entire country and that it “does some business in
every State, either directly or indirectly.”274 Thus, the court reasoned that Mylan
“undisputedly” planned to sell these particular drugs in Delaware once its
ANDAs were approved.275 Furthermore, the court was unconvinced that a
finding of specific jurisdiction could not be reached on the basis of planned
future conduct.276 Thus, because the connection between Mylan’s planned acts
and the litigation was “close enough,” Mylan’s conduct “g[ave] rise and [was]
related to the suit.”277
The court also made a point to address the concurrence’s concern that Mylan’s
allegedly infringing drugs might never actually be marketed in Delaware.278 It
reasoned that, even if Mylan never sells directly in Delaware, the purposeful
availment prong would still be satisfied in light of Mylan’s network of
wholesalers and distributors in the state, which demonstrated that Mylan places
products in the stream-of-commerce with the intent of reaching Delaware.279
Lastly, the court reasoned that the fairness prong of the specific jurisdiction
268. Id. at 760 (citing Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 763 (internal alterations omitted).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 760.
276. Id. at 762.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 763; see also id. at 770 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
279. Id. at 763 (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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analysis was satisfied, given the “modest” burden on Mylan and the more
significant countervailing interests of the plaintiffs and the State of Delaware.280
Accordingly, Delaware’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction was deemed
appropriate.281
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Kathleen O’Malley found Delaware’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction appropriate on both general and specific
jurisdiction grounds.282 Concerned with Judge Taranto’s reliance on Mylan’s
“expressions of future intent,”283 however, Judge O’Malley found specific
jurisdiction by ruling that Mylan’s ANDA filings were acts “calculated and
directed to cause harm to the intellectual property rights” of Acorda and
AstraZeneca in their place of incorporation, Delaware.284 Though the “intent”
concerns were certainly valid, this ruling would lead to an untenable position,
whereby specific jurisdiction would never be warranted at the “place of the
patent” because of an actual patent infringement,285 but could always occur at
the “place of the patent” if the patent infringement is merely artificial.286 In any
event, neither the majority nor the concurrence issued the type of finding that
ANDA cases so desperately need—a clarification of the Federal Circuit’s nexus
standard.

280. Id. at 763–64.
281. Id. at 764.
282. Id. at 773 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
283. Id. at 770 (emphasis omitted).
284. Id. at 772.
285. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(finding that the situs of patent injuries is at the place of infringing sales, not the place of the patent);
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558-60 (D. Del. 2014).
286. See Acorda, 817 F.3d at 772 & n.2 (O’Malley, J., concurring). Even though this theory
was advanced by the concurrence only, at least one court has interpreted the Acorda II majority’s
ruling to stand for this proposition as well. In a recent Delaware District Court decision, Judge
Gregory M. Sleet (notably, the author of the AstraZeneca opinion) determined that the Acorda II
court held that “the act of filing an ANDA application that potentially infringes the patent of a
Delaware entity provides sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Delaware under a specific
jurisdiction analysis.” Millenium Pharms., Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., No. 15-702-GMS, 2016 WL
3382131, at *1 (D. Del. Jun. 10, 2016). In fact, even though the defendant Millenium
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was a Canadian corporation which did not have its principal place of business
in Delaware, was not incorporated in Delaware, had not registered to business in Delaware, did not
have an agent for service of process in Delaware, had not prepared its ANDA in Delaware, had not
sent its Paragraph IV notification letter to Delaware, and had never sold drugs in Delaware—it had
never even imported drugs into the United States—the court found that Delaware’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction was appropriate under Acorda II. Millenium, 2016 WL 3382131, at *3.
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V. A PERMISSIVE NEXUS STANDARD IS NEEDED IN ANDA CASES
A. The Federal Circuit Should Have Used Acorda II to Clarify its Preferred
Nexus Test
In the patent context, Federal Circuit law governs over regional circuits, even
when considering procedural questions like the requirements of personal
jurisdiction,287 unless of course Supreme Court precedent dictates otherwise. As
the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the issue in general,288 going forward,
the Federal Circuit’s nexus approach under Acorda II is authoritative in all
ANDA cases. Thus, under Acorda II, a court must ask whether a defendant’s
“suit-related” conduct created (or rather, would create) a “substantial
connection” to the forum.289 From Acorda II, we know that the “substantial
connection” will be satisfied when the evidence “reliably indicates” that the
generic intends to direct its products at the forum.290 In particular, that intent for
future conduct can be established by showing that the ANDA filer registered to
do business, provided an agent for service of process, and registered with a
Board of Pharmacy in the forum, so long as the company also develops its drugs
for the entire U.S. market.291
Yet, basing personal jurisdiction on potential future conduct is problematic,
as it is unclear whether future contacts should even be considered in a personal
jurisdiction analysis.292 And to the extent future contacts are relevant to the
287. Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at
1564.
288. See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(observing that “the nexus necessary to satisfy the ‘arise out of or related to’ requirement of the due
process inquiry has not been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court,” and proceeding to set forth
the governing law of the Federal Circuit).
289. Acorda, 817 F.3d at 760.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 763.
292. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nang Kuang Pharm. Co., Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-01647-TWPDKL, 2015 WL 3744557, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jun. 15, 2015) (denying a request for discovery related
to the jurisdictional contacts that would exist upon defendants’ ANDA approval, because “personal
jurisdiction cannot be based on future contacts, even if such contacts are allegedly inevitable”)
(internal alterations omitted); Koninklijke Phillips N.V. v. Digital Works, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01341JAD-NJK, 2014 WL 3816395, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 4, 2014) (finding no specific jurisdiction where
the “jurisdictional basis [was] one of potential future contacts only”); see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 35, at *19–20 (highlighting backward-looking language in the Supreme
Court’s line of personal jurisdiction cases, and arguing that “to determine whether a claim arises
out of a contact with the forum state, one must necessarily look back, not forward”); but see, e.g.,
Acorda, 817 F.3d at 762 (“Mylan does not meaningfully develop an argument that a rigid
past/future dividing line governs the minimum-contacts standard. Specifically, Mylan does not
show that a State is forbidden to exercise its judicial power to prevent a defendant’s planned future
conduct in the State, but must wait until the conduct occurs.”); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware
GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2012) (in a breach of contract suit, finding that
“contemplated future consequences” of prior negotiations “must be evaluated in determining
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum”).
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analysis, “expressions of future intent” will not always be so obvious.293 For
instance, even if a generic could introduce reliable evidence to show that it has
absolutely no intent to sell a particular drug in a particular forum, arguably, a
pioneer could always trump the generic’s showing by pointing to the same
“undisputed” evidence of intent that was relied upon by the Acorda II
majority.294 While any due process concerns should ultimately be caught in the
“fairness” prong of the minimum contacts inquiry, disallowing evidence of nonintent simply because the “substantial connection” analysis indicates the
existence of intent is counterintuitive.
Moreover, if a future defendant’s contacts do not directly mirror Mylan’s
(e.g., because a state’s regulatory scheme differs), a court’s “substantial
connection” analysis is completely unpredictable.295 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit missed an excellent opportunity to clear up confusion for litigants
involved in an already-complex area of procedural and substantive law. Instead,
Acorda II just added another layer of complexity.
B. The Federal Circuit Should Have Officially Adopted the “Sliding Scale”
Test
An easier, and more effective, approach for the Federal Circuit to take would
have been to reaffirm (or at least clarify) its previous nexus standard. Prior to
Acorda II, the Federal Circuit preferred a permissive interpretation which
emphasized the disjunctive nature of the “arise out of or relate to” language, and
which was more flexible than a strict “arise out of” standard.296 This approach
was arguably akin to the “sliding scale” test adopted in some circuits, whereby
courts consider the totality of the circumstances, balancing (1) the closeness of
a defendant’s contacts to the litigation, with (2) the quality and quantity of those
contacts.297 Accordingly, the less related the contacts are, the more quality and
quantity is needed to support the exercise of jurisdiction, and vice versa.298
Under this test, the Federal Circuit would have likely found that Mylan’s
uncontroverted contacts with Delaware satisfied the nexus requirement of the
specific jurisdiction analysis, without needing to reach an “undisputed” finding
of future intent.
Specifically, Mylan registered to do business in Delaware, registered with the
Delaware Board of Pharmacy, derived significant revenues from previous sales
of its products in Delaware, and filed ANDAs with the FDA that threatened to

293. Id. at 770 (O’Malley, J., concurring) (emphasis removed).
294. See id. at 759–60, 762–63.
295. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
296. See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45
F.3d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
297. Moore, The Relatedness Problem, supra note 154, at 593.
298. Id.
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cut short the patent terms of drugs held by two Delaware companies.299 Though
it could not be said that any of those contacts immediately “gave rise” to the
litigation, they are certainly closely “related to” Acorda and AstraZeneca’s
claims. In fact, considering ANDA litigation arises from the “highly artificial
act of infringement” generated at the moment a generic company files an ANDA
with the FDA, Mylan’s contacts are about as “close” as it gets.300 Moreover,
under the sliding scale, Mylan’s contacts are of the requisite “quality and
quantity.”301 Specifically, as one of the biggest generic drug manufacturers in
the country, Mylan sells its drugs in every state, including Delaware.302 Pursuant
to Delaware’s statutory registration scheme, it is set up to continue selling
pharmaceuticals in the state, provided that whatever drugs it intends to sell are
first approved and determined by the FDA to not infringe another company’s
patents.303 By filing ANDAs against Acorda and AstraZeneca’s patents, Mylan
seeks to convince the FDA of exactly that.304
In effect, Mylan is locked and loaded, ready to start selling in Delaware as
soon as it is legally permitted. Thus, on balance, Mylan’s contacts would have
been “substantial” enough to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
Delaware under the “sliding scale” test.305 Though the Acorda II “substantial
connection” analysis ultimately reached the same conclusion, adopting the
“sliding scale” would have confirmed the Federal Circuit’s preference for a
permissive nexus standard, and more importantly, it would have given lower
courts a cognizable standard which could have been easily replicated. In any
event, some important policy considerations weigh in favor of confirming a
permissive nexus test in future ANDA cases.

299. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 552–53 (D. Del. 2014).
300. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 596 (D. Del. 2015).
This argument is even stronger for AstraZeneca, as Mylan actually sent notification of the
Paragraph IV certification to AstraZeneca in Delaware. However, as the court was quick to make
clear in Acorda I, though mailing such a letter is undoubtedly an “additional activity” directed at
the forum, it is not an outcome determinative one for the purposes of specific jurisdiction. Id. And
in either case, Mylan’s other contacts would be sufficiently “close” to satisfy the test.
301. See Metallo, supra note 140, at 434.
302. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 817 F.3d 760, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
303. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 371, 376 (2016));
see also Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
304. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 551.
305. Notably, the Supreme Court of California actually considers the substantial connection
test and the sliding scale test to be interchangeable legal standards. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court of San Francisco Cty., 377 P.3d 874, 885 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) (“Under the
substantial connection test, the intensity of the forum contacts and the connection of the claim to
those contacts are inversely related. The more wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the
more readily is shown a connection to the forum contacts and the claim.”); see also id. at 889
(recognizing that the court had previously “made clear that [it] had adopted a sliding scale approach
to specific jurisdiction in which [it] recognized that the more wide ranging the defendant’s forum
contacts, the more readily is shown a connection to the forum contacts and the claim.”).
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C. Public Policy Considerations Favor a Lenient Nexus Test in HatchWaxman Cases
Disregarding the various approaches to the nexus requirement for just a
moment, the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question whether “arise out
of” and “relate to” are interchangeable or distinctive terms in Helicopteros, and
has refused to address the question since then.306 Thus, even though many courts
view the nexus requirement through the prism of tort law causation standards—
using tests that sound much more like “arise out of” than “arise out of or relate
to”307—it is certainly possible that the Court intended the nexus requirement to
treat some or all plaintiffs’ claims with leniency, at least at such an early phase
of the specific jurisdiction analysis. In fact, when considered within the context
of the other specific jurisdiction prongs, it seems likely that leniency is exactly
what the Court had in mind. Specifically, even if the litigation were to only
“relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the defendant would still
need to have purposefully availed itself to the forum, and the exercise of
jurisdiction would still need to pass the fairness test.308 In fact, the Supreme
Court has arguably adopted a sliding scale-like balancing test for the other
prongs of the specific jurisdiction analysis already.309
A rigid nexus standard would make the exercise of specific jurisdiction nearly
impossible in certain instances, an outcome which is hard to swallow, especially
in light of the recent tightening of general jurisdiction under Daimler and
Goodyear. Paragraph IV certification litigation highlights this problem, and
calls to mind Justice Brennan’s premonitions in his Helicopteros dissent—a
rigid nexus requirement “subject[ing] constitutional standards under the Due
Process Clause to the vagaries of the substantive law. . . .”310 Because, by
definition, infringement arises almost out of thin air upon the submission of an
ANDA to the FDA, there are no physical contacts giving rise to the litigation
other than the ANDA submission. Though Mylan willingly admitted it was
subject to general jurisdiction in West Virginia and conceded that it was subject
to specific jurisdiction in West Virginia because it engaged in its pre-submission
activities there, can it really be said that the mere act of filling out an ANDA
“gave rise” to the litigation?311 Considering all filers must submit their ANDAs
306. See supra Sections II.C.1–2.
307. See supra Section II.C.2.
308. See supra Section II.B.
309. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985) (explaining that a
“lesser showing” of minimum contacts can be overcome with a strong demonstration of fairness,
and that where purposeful availment is clearly satisfied, a defendant must make a “compelling case”
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unfair).
310. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
311. See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 559–60 n.13 (D. Del.
2014) (stating that “[s]everal district courts have found that the state in which the ANDA is prepared
. . . is the proper forum for the exercise of specific jurisdiction [but t]the court is not convinced that
the focus should be on [this] factor[]” and reasoning that “the act of merely preparing an ANDA
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to FDA headquarters, the most logical place for Hatch-Waxman litigation would
seemingly be Maryland. However, the Federal Circuit explicitly shut Maryland
down as a viable forum in Zeneca out of fear that it would become a
“supercourt.”312
Thus, had the Federal Circuit not identified the forums in which a generic
intends to sell as proper, patent holders would have been left with only two
forums in which they could plausibly obtain relief under a rigid nexus
standard—the defendant’s principal place of business, or its place of
incorporation.313 In other words, in an ANDA litigation context, a rigid nexus
test would limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to general jurisdiction only.
Such a result would be far-removed from the original intent of the HatchWaxman Act, which again, sought to balance two interests: “(1) inducing
pioneering research and development of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors
to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to market.”314 Yet, when a
generic files a Paragraph IV certification, which effectively means that it (1)
intends to release a competing drug into the market during the pioneer’s patent
term,315 and (2) believes the patent is “invalid or will not be infringed” by the
drug’s release,316 the generic would be afforded the right to “hole up” in its home
forum and let the pioneer bring the fight to it. In the wrong jurisdiction, that
could easily become a perpetually losing fight for pioneer drug companies. In
fact, were such a generic-friendly forum to come into existence, it might likely
attract other generic companies to incorporate and set up their headquarters
there, which in turn might attract more litigation.317 In other words, such a forum
could plausibly lead to a “supercourt,” much like the one Judge Gajarsa sought
to avoid in Maryland in his Zeneca opinion.318
What would the pioneer’s options be at that point? (1) Sue in the generic’s
home state, where it would likely be subject to a greater risk of losing.319 (2)
does not create a harm[, rather, o]nly the act of filing the ANDA, and thus triggering the patentholder’s forty-five days to initiate a lawsuit, is recognized as an injury giving rise to potential
infringement liability”) (citation omitted); but see, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Synthon Holding, B.V., 386
F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Intendis, Inc. v. River’s Edge Pharms., LLC, No. 112838 (FSH) (PS), 2011 WL 5513195, at *7–9 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2011).
312. Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
313. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2014).
314. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
315. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 3, at 600.
316. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
317. See Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 6, at 917.
318. See Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 831–32 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
319. Professor Kimberly A. Moore, now a Judge on the Federal Circuit, published a study in
2001 regarding choice of forum in patent cases. Among other findings, she determined that patent
cases are not evenly distributed across jurisdictions. Rather, they are concentrated in only a few
courts, suggesting that parties are actively seeking certain locations to file their infringement suits.
Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 6, at 903–04. For example, the empirical evidence showed
that the Northern District of California was the second-most popular forum for patent cases from
1995–1999. Id. at 903. In that district, patent-holders had a significantly higher chance of winning
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Don’t sue, and wait for the generic to file a declaratory judgment action in a
forum it chooses320—again, presumably in the generic’s home state. Or (3),
don’t sue, and let the generic company release its competing drug into the
market, ending the patent term that was awarded to the pioneer for taking a
revolutionary drug through various levels of research and development.321
Limiting a patent-holder’s choice to only these three options would be
legitimately unfair. More importantly, such an outcome would impermissibly
tip the Hatch-Waxman balancing scales significantly in favor of generic
companies seeking to produce and sell low-cost copies of pioneer drug products,
de-incentivizing pioneering research and development, and undermining the
entire purpose of the Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Acorda II presented the Federal Circuit with a rich set of possible questions
to answer, but it should have used the case to confirm its preference for a lenient
nexus test in Hatch-Waxman cases, considering the Federal Circuit’s own sound
precedent on the matter, and the strong public policy implications in favor of
such an interpretation. Still, given the unique “artificial” nature of the cause of
action in ANDA suits and the contacts that Mylan has with the state of Delaware,
the Federal Circuit properly found that the Delaware courts’ exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction over Mylan was appropriate because the nexus requirement
was satisfied, Mylan had purposefully availed itself to the forum, and the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction was fair. Yet, if the Federal Circuit is ever presented
with the question again, it should take the opportunity to add some much-needed
procedural clarity to an already-complicated ANDA litigation process.

infringement suits as compared to other jurisdictions. Given the concentration of technology
companies residing there, Moore suggests that perhaps this result is not surprising. Id. at 917.
320. Moore’s data also suggests that the party choosing the forum is more likely to win,
regardless of whether it is the patent-holder in an infringement suit, or the alleged infringer in a
declaratory judgment action. Id. at 920–21.
321. See supra notes 39–40, 88–89 and accompanying text.

